We estimate the effects of trade facilitation on export diversification, as measured by two extensive margins: the number of products exported by destination and the number of export destinations served by product. To address the issue of causality, we employ an identification strategy whereby only exports of new products, or exports to new destinations, are taken into account when computing the respective margins of trade. We find a positive impact of trade facilitation on the extensive margins of trade. The results are robust to alternative definitions of extensive margins, different sets of controls and various estimation methods. Simulation results suggest substantial extensive margin gains from trade facilitation reform in SubSaharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Introduction
Trade economists have for some time now emphasized the need to bring down trade costs, which by many estimates remain quite sizeable. Even for a "representative rich country", Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) have estimated that the ad valorem equivalent of trade costs could be as high as 170%. As shown by Arvis et al. (2013) The new agreement will enter into force and become an integral part of the WTO Agreement once two-thirds of WTO members complete their domestic ratification process.
An example of how trade facilitation can simplify trade procedures and make them more transparent can be taken from a country which became a WTO Member in 2013 -the Lao People's Democratic Republic. An online portal for trade has been operative since 2012.
1 On this website, all trade-related laws, regulations, measures, restrictions, licensing requirements and tariffs are indexed, cross-referenced, and made searchable by commodity code. The website also includes detailed process maps of business procedures for importing and exporting; full listings of national standards for products; procedures for clearing goods at the border; downloadable forms; and e-alerts which traders can customize to receive information.
The importance of achieving success in the WTO negotiations on trade facilitation has been underlined by a fair amount of empirical work. Various approaches for measuring the benefit of a multilateral agreement on trade facilitation have been pursued, including how much it will reduce trade costs, how much trade will increase, as well as the positive impact on jobs and on GDP. One effect that seems not to have been explored in sufficient depth is the effect on export diversification. To the extent that trade and customs procedures act like fixed costs, they prevent exporters from entering new markets or selling a wider array of products. The benefit of export diversification over selling more of the same product or selling more to the same market is the resulting reduction in risk from shocks to international trade. Exporters with diversified export baskets 1 See http://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/index.php?r=site/index. 1 or destinations are likely to be better insulated from shocks to specific markets or sectors than others.
There are various approaches taken in the literature to measure, more or less directly, trade facilitation. Several studies the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and Doing Business indicators as proxies.
The LPI is based on a worldwide survey of operators on the ground, providing feedback on the logistics 'friendliness' of the countries in which they operate and those with which they trade. In addition, survey data is supplemented with quantitative data on the performance of key components of the logistics chain in a given country. This includes the quality of trade and transport infrastructure. Doing Business indicators use data on the time and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods by sea transport. The time and cost necessary to complete every official procedure for exporting and importing the goods are included as well.
The OECD has developed indicators on import, export and transit trade that are closely related, and can Each of these variables is scored following a 'multiple binary scheme' where the score of two corresponds to the best performance, zero corresponds to the worst performance and a score of one to performance that lies in between.
This paper makes use of the OECD TFIs to estimate the impact of trade facilitation on export diversification, as measured by extensive margins of trade. In the baseline estimations, we consider two types of extensive margins: the number of products (HS sub-headings) by export destination, and the number of export destinations by product. We also consider theory-based extensive margins: the bilateral extensive margin suggested by Hummels and Klenow (2005) , and an exporter-product extensive margin that, to the 2 best of our knowledge, has not previously been explored in the literature.
While we are not the first to study the extensive-margin effects of trade facilitation, we are the first to do so using the OECD TFIs. Moreover, we add to the existing literature by considering an exporter-product, not only a bilateral dimension of trade margins. A third novel contribution of this paper is the quantification of the effect of implementing trade facilitation under two realistic scenarios: (i) trade facilitation reform that moves countries that are below the median of their region to that benchmark; and (ii) reform that moves countries that are below the global median to that level.
Throughout this study, we focus on trade facilitation in the exporting country. When analyzing the number of destinations by product, this is the only viable option. When analyzing the number of products by destination, we are aware that increases in importers' trade facilitation are likely to have a positive effect.
The empirical question of interest, however, concerns the effects of own's trade facilitation for given levels of trade facilitation in destination markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the literature on trade facilitation. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology to estimate the effect of trade facilitation on trade margins. We first define the indicators for the different trade margins used in the empirical analysis.
Next, we specify the econometric model. In Section 4, we present the empirical results. Section 5 presents estimations that use alternative measurements of trade margins and of trade facilitation. It also discusses various methodologies employed to test whether the effects are heterogeneous across counties and sectors.
Section 6 includes the results of simulations under the two scenarios of convergence to the regional median and convergence to the global median. Section 7 concludes.
Literature
Trade facilitation has a significant potential to reduce trade costs. This effect has been quantified by a series of empirical studies that follow the methodology of Novy (2013) to infer trade costs from the observed pattern of production and trade across countries. Chen and Novy (2009) Firms that did not export before may be able to do so now, since their revenues could cover the lower fixed costs of exporting (Melitz, 2003) . Trade facilitation can, therefore, both expand existing trade flows (intensive margin effect) and create new trade flows (extensive margin effect).
Empirical evidence on the intensive margin effects is provided by several authors. Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2009) Zaki (2014) shows that the time to import (export) is equivalent to a mean ad valorem tax of 34.2% (17.6%) for developing countries. A study by Hummels and Schaur (2013) shows that each day in transit is worth 0.6%-2% of the value of the 2 Their preferred specification explains 80.8% of the variation in trade costs. 42.8% is attributable to the 3-digit industry fixed effects. Of the 38% that the remaining regressors explain, geography and transport costs alone are responsible for about 25%; policy variables explain 7.6%, with technical barriers to trade (TBTs) being the most important policy factor (4.5%). TBTs therefore explain 11.8% of the variation in trade costs not accounted for by unobservable industry characteristics.
good and that time is particularly important for intermediate goods. However, Freund and Rocha (2011) find that when comparing the effects of transit, documentation, and ports and customs delays on trade, the most significant effect comes from inland transit delays. Each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 per cent, as found by Djankov et al. (2010) . A result which combines the effects of time and costs is obtained by Hausman et al. (2013) . In their study, a 1% reduction in processing costs/time leads to 0.49%-0.37% of increased bilateral trade. There is also firm-level evidence showing the adverse effect of customs delays on trade. Using a sample of Uruguayan firms, Volpe Martincus et al. (2013) show that an increase by two days in the duration of export inspections reduces exports by 16.4%. Moreover, exports would be 5.9% larger if all exports could be processed within one day.
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Some studies in this literature use econometric results from gravity equations to perform counterfactual analysis. Hoekman and Nicita (2011) simulate the effect of policy convergence by low income countries to the average of middle income countries. The percentage increase in exports (imports) of low income countries that would result from a combined convergence of the Doing Business 'cost of trading' indicator and of the LPI score to the average of middle income countries would be 17% (13.5%).
4 Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2012) simulate the effects of improving trade facilitation (broadly encompassing physical infrastructure, information and communications technology, border and transport efficiency as well as business and regulatory environment). Their benchmark is an improvement half-way to the level of the top performing country in the region. The 'ad valorem tariff-cut equivalents' they estimate are heterogeneous across regions, with investment in physical infrastructure generally resulting in the largest trade gains. Hufbauer et al. (2013) perform a thought experiment in which countries lift their trade facilitation halfway to the region's top performer in each category. They estimate an increase in total merchandise exports of developing countries of $569 billion (9.9%) and an increase in total exports of developed countries of $475 billion (4.5%).
The empirical evidence on the extensive margins effects of trade facilitation is more limited than the one on the intensive margins. Nordås et al. (2006) were among the first to show the negative effects of time to export on the probability to export. Dennis and Shepherd (2011) estimate the impact of various Doing
Business indicators on the number of products that developing countries export to and import from the European Union. They find that poor trade facilitation has a negative impact on developing country export diversification. Another approach is taken by Feenstra and Ma (2014) . They proxy trade facilitation with port efficiency and estimate its impact on export variety, a theory-based measure of the extensive margin.
They show a positive and significant effect of port efficiency on export variety. Finally, Persson (2013) distinguishes between the effects of trade facilitation (measured using the number of days needed to export from the World Bank's Doing Business indicators) on homogenous and differentiated products. She finds that trade facilitation has a higher impact on differentiated products. Reducing export transaction costs increases the number of differentiated products by 0.7% and by 0.4% for homogenous products.
Empirical methodology
In this section, we define trade margins and trade facilitation indicators. Next, we outline the econometric approach.
Trade margins
We consider the relationship between trade facilitation and two indicators of trade margins: the number of exported products by destination and the number of export destinations by product.
The number of exported products by destination, npd ij , counts how many products country i exports to destination j. As a baseline, we define 'products' as HS sub-headings (6 digit HS codes Again, the disaggregation over World Bank regions reveals relatively low scores for Sub-Saharan Africa (with an average of 1 destination served by product), and relatively high scores for Asian countries (with an average of 16 and 9 destinations served by product by East Asia and Pacific and South Asia, respectively).
The incidence of zeros is also highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (68% of observations). The same incidence ranges between 36% and 51% for other regions.
Panel (c) of Table 1 presents the summary statistics for ndp ik computed using HS4 trade data, that is, defining 'products' as HS headings. The number of observations and the percentage of zeros are clearly lower than for ndp ik computed from HS6 trade data. Conversely, in the ij sample the sample size is determined by the number of exporting and importing countries, not by the level of sectoral disaggregation.
< Table 1 about here >
In the construction of npd ij and of ndp ik , we rely on mirror trade data to the extent possible because import data tend to be more complete than export data. We therefore measure exports of country i in product k using the reported imports of country j in the same product. For the few country-years for which mirror data is not available, we rely on reported export data. 
Trade Facilitation Indicators
The sample used for the regressions includes data for 133 countries for which OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) are available.
6 Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variable TFI. This is the simple average of the country-specific indicators T F I
The average is unweighted because there 5 Mirror data is not available for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 for the following countries with TFI information: Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, The Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Mali, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Qatar and Suriname.
6 The full list of countries by World Bank region group, with information on the date of WTO (GATT, where applicable) membership, is available in Appendix Table A-2. 7 We only have information on indicators A-L.
7 is no criterion in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement or in its previous drafts to rank different indicators in terms of their relevance. Since each sub-indicator ranges between 0 and 2, so does TFI. Among developing and emerging economies, the scores are lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa and highest in Europe and Central Asia. 8 There is however substantial variation within these regions, and especially within Sub-Saharan Africa (where the best-performing country, Mauritius, has a score of 1.93). The fact that the best performer in Sub-Saharan Africa (the region with the lowest average of TFI) has the highest score in the data suggests that a scenario in which all countries in the region move to the best performer's value is unlikely. We will take this into account in the simulations of Section 6.
< Table 2 about here >
Econometric model
The TFI data does not vary over time. We therefore estimate cross-sectional regressions for the year 2009.
We choose this year for two reasons. First, this is suggested by Moïsé and Sorescu (2013) . Second, this allows us to construct measures for npd ij and ndp ik that are respectively based on new products and new destinations, to address endogeneity concerns (see Section 4). 
ij regressions
The ij regressions use, as dependent variable, the number of exported products, npd ij . This is a bilateral measure of trade outcomes. It is therefore natural to employ a gravity framework, with the conditional mean of the dependent variable expressed as:
is a function; x 1i is a vector of variables that only vary across exporters i's; r i is a vector of exporter-specific region dummies; 10 w ij is a vector of standard bilateral gravity variables; m ij is a vector of multilateral resistance terms, constructed using the methodology outlined in Baier and Bergstrand 8 It is important to note that the latter region does not include industrialized OECD countries -see Table A -2. 9 The results with all time-varying variables averaged between 2002 and 2010 are very similar to the ones presented here and are available upon request.
10 World Bank region dummies are included because in the simulations of Section 6 we average results over such regions.
(2009); 11 d j is a vector of importer (j)-specific effects; β, θ, δ, η and γ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated. Appendix Table A -3 provides a description of all the variables, including the data sources.
12 Table 3 presents summary statistics for all control variables.
< Table 3 about here >
As a first step, we estimate a linear fixed effects model by OLS, with the dependent variable in logs, conditioning on importer-specific effects. In this case, g(⋅) in (3.1) is the identity function. Since the dependent variable is a count variable, a model for count data is more appropriate (Dennis and Shepherd, 2011; Persson, 2013) . Accordingly, we also adopt conditional Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) Maximum Likelihood estimations, with the dependent variable in levels (always conditioning on importer-specific effects). In this case, g(⋅) in (3.1) is the exponential function.
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Appendix Table A -4 presents the in-sample correlations between all variables in the ij sample.
ik regressions
The ik regressions use, as dependent variable, the number of export destinations, ndp ik . This measure of trade outcomes does not have any bilateral dimension, since it varies by exporting country i and by product k. We express the conditional mean of the dependent variable as:
is a function; h k is a vector vector of product (k)-specific effects; α, φ and λ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated. The vectors x 2i and x 1i differ from one another in the following respects.
x 2i , but not x 1i , contains the variable Log(remoteness) -a weighted average of partners' (j's) world GDP shares, with the inverse distance between i and j as weight (Head and Mayer, 2013) . Further, x 1i , but not x 2i , contains the variable Log(weighted j's TFI) -a weighted average of partners' (j's) TFI indicators, with the inverse distance between i and j as weight.
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In this case, too, we present a fixed effect linear specification (OLS with dependent variable in logs) as a first step. g(⋅) in (3.2) is the identity function in this case. We then adopt conditional Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) Maximum Likelihood estimations with the dependent variable in levels. g(⋅) in (3.2) is the exponential function in this case. We always condition on product-specific effects.
Appendix Table A -5 presents the in-sample correlations between all variables in the ik sample.
Results

ij regressions
The results of the ij regressions are in Table 4 . In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is in logs, while it is in levels in the Poisson and NB regressions. In both cases, however, the coefficients on the explanatory variables in logs can be interpreted as elasticities.
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< Table 4 about here >
The baseline results are in columns (1), (2) and (6), respectively for OLS, Poisson and NB regressions. The coefficient on the variable of interest, Log(TFI), is positive and statistically significant in all specifications.
In the specification of column (6), the elasticity is 0.305, implying that a 1% increase in the average trade facilitation indicator is roughly associated with a 0.3% increase in the number of HS6 products exported by destination.
The coefficients on the control variables are correctly signed and statistically significant. Although the dependent variable is different, it is useful to compare the distance coefficients with the standard results from gravity studies. As reported in Table of 4 Head and Mayer (2013) , the mean of the distance coefficient estimated in 159 papers ranges between -0.93 and -1.1, with a standard deviation of 0.40-0.41. The distance elasticity we obtain is in line with Table 4 of Head and Mayer (2013) for the OLS estimation. In the Poisson and NB model it is lower, but it is a well-established fact in the literature that the distance coefficient is lower when using count-data models. Moreover, our result is very similar to the one obtained by Persson (2013) , which is the most comparable study to ours.
We see two possible concerns with the baseline estimations. First, and foremost, we cannot exclude reverse causation, that is the possibility that trade outcomes affect the incentives to invest in trade facilitation, and consequently the trade facilitation scores. In the spirit of Freund and Rocha (2011) and Portugal-Perez and
Wilson (2012), we address possible reverse causality using only 'new products' (HS sub-headings) in the construction of the dependent variable. We proceed as follows: when computing how many products country The results are in columns (3) and (7) of Table 4 . The coefficients are slightly lower than in the baseline regressions (indicating the possibility of a small downward bias induced by reverse causality), but still positive and statistically significant.
The second possible concern with the baseline estimations of Table 4 relates to the measurement of trade facilitation. So far, we have used TFI -the unweighted average of the country-specific OECD Trade Fa- 
ik regressions
The results of ik regressions are in Table 5 . The structure of the table is similar to that of Table 4 .
< Table 5 about here >
The coefficient on Log(TFI) is positive and significant in all specifications. The estimated elasticity in column (6) is 0.383. This implies that a 1% increase in the average trade facilitation indicator is roughly associated with a 0.38% increase in the number of destinations to which an HS6 product is exported.
In columns (3) and (7) we address possible reverse causality concerns using only 'new destinations' in the computation of the dependent variable. The procedure is very similar in spirit to the one described above In the regressions with new destinations, the estimated coefficient on Log(TFI) is slightly larger than the baseline coefficient, both in the Poisson and in the NB specifications.
In columns (5) and (5) The results of ij and ik regressions using trade margins based on HS4 trade data are in Table 6 . For ij regressions, Poisson and NB baseline results should be compared with columns (2) and (6) of Table 4 , respectively. Results with new products (columns (2) and (4)) shoud be compared with columns (3) and (7) of Table 4 . For ik regressions, columns (5) and (7) should be compared with columns (2) and (6) of Table   5 , while columns (6) and (8) should be compared with columns (3) and (7) of Table 5 . All coefficients on Log(TFI) are quite similar across comparable regressions. This implies that our results are not affected by the level of product disaggregation of the data.
< Table 6 about here >
Hummel-Klenow trade margins
In this section, we present econometric estimates using the theory-based 'Hummels-Klenow extensive margins' as dependent variables. In the regressions with country pairs, we use the following variable, directly from Hummels and Klenow (2005) :
In equation (5.1), K ij is the set of goods which country i exports to country j; w is the reference country that has positive exports to j in all products k (in the empirical implementation, it is the rest of the world);
K is the set of all products; X wjk are the exports of country w to country j in product k. em ij is therefore the share of those exports to j only in goods k that country i exports in total exports to country j.
In the regressions with country-product observations, we construct a similar measure (not previously used in the reviewed literature):
In equation (5.2), J ik is the set of destinations to which country i exports product k; w is the reference country that has positive exports of k to all destinations j (in the empirical implementation, it is the rest 13 of the world); J is the set of all destinations; X wjk are -as in equation (5.1) -the exports of country w to country j in product k. em ik is therefore the share of exports of k only to destinations j that country i exports to in total exports of product k to all destinations.
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The summary statistics for the Hummels-Klenow extensive margins em ij and em ik are in Appendix Table A-6. In the developing world, Hummels-Klenow extensive margins, and therefore export diversification, are lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa and highest in East Asia and Pacific. From a qualitative standpoint, these descriptive statistics are in line with the ones presented in Table 1 for npd ij and ndp ik . In fact, the sample correlation between npd ij and em ij is equal to 0.89, while the sample correlation between ndp ik and em ik is equal to 0.83.
19 Table 7 present the results of ij and ik regressions using, as dependent variable, the Hummels-Klenow extensive margins em ij and em ik , respectively. The dependent variable ranges between zero and one. As suggested by Baum (2008) , we use a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with a logit transformation of the response variable and the binomial distribution. Odd-numbered columns present baseline results, in which the respective trade margin is calculated using trade data from 2009. In even-numbered columns we address concerns related to reverse causality and construct the dependent variable using only the subset of new products (in the case of em ij ) or new destinations (in the case of em ik ).
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< Table 7 about here > In the ij regressions, controlling for country characteristics, partner j dummies, region dummies and bilateral control variables, the coefficient on Log(TFI) is positive, but it loses statistical significance in column (2). In the ik regressions, where we control for country characteristics, product k dummies and region dummies, only the coefficient on Log(TFI) in column (3) is correctly signed and statistically significant. When we use the definition of the Hummels-Klenow extensive margin em ik based on new destinations, this coefficient turns negative and statistically significant. There is no easy way to explain this counter-intuitive result. It should be mentioned, however, that the coefficient on Log(TFI) is correctly signed and statistically significant if we perform the same regression of column (4) of Table 7 using HS4 headings in the construction em ik .
World Bank Doing Business indicators
Following, among others, Hoekman and Nicita (2011) 
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To increase comparability with the results that use the OECD TFIs, we transform these variables as follows.
First, we compute their inverse. Then, we rescale them between 0 (least facilitation) and 2 (most facilitation).
Appendix Table A -7 presents the in-sample correlations among these variables, and the correlations between these variables and TFI.
The results are in Table 8 . All the coefficients on DB docs, DB cost and DB time are consistently positive across all specifications, both in the ij and in the ik regressions. It should be noted that ij regressions use the same set of explanatory variables as Table 4 and ik regressions use the same set of explanatory variables as Table 5 .
< Table 8 The total number of documents required per shipment to export goods. Documents required for clearance by government ministries, customs authorities, port and container terminal authorities, health and technical control agencies and banks are taken into account. 22 The time necessary to comply with all procedures required to export goods. 23 The cost associated with all procedures required to export goods. It includes the costs for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal handling charges and inland transport.
OECD TFIs), should be non-discriminatory in nature and therefore benefit all trading partners equally. If this is the case, one should not expect any heterogeneous effect of exporter's trade facilitation on the extensive margin of bilateral trade across importers with a PTA with the exporter and importers without.
To test this prediction, we augment the ij regressions with an interaction term between the PTA dummy and Log(TFI). We do not obtain any consistent pattern in the results. In most regressions, the marginal effect when the PTA dummy is equal to one is not statistically different from the marginal effect when the PTA dummy is equal to zero. The evidence that an exporting country's trade facilitation does not have a higher impact on the bilateral extensive margin with importers with which it has a PTA provides indirect support for the idea that the trade facilitation provisions captured by the OECD TFIs (and disciplined by the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement) are non-discriminatory.
In a similar way, we investigate the effects of having a common border (without any significant result) or a common language. Although obtaining significant results in a few instances, indicating that trade facilitation is even more important if the trading partners have different languages, we do not find consistent results across all specifications.
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One might be concerned that our results might be driven by developed countries only. To rule this out, we split the ij sample in four subsamples: DD (both exporter i and importer j are developed);
25 DG (i is developed, j is developing); GD (i is developing, j is developed); GG (both i and j are developing). As shown in Table 9 , each of these subsample covers approximately one quarter of the ij dataset. Although varying in magnitude across different specifications, the results are qualitatively similar across sub-samples.
We therefore reject the hypothesis that our results are driven by developed countries.
< 26 Yi's model shows the magnifying trade effects of tariff reductions when vertically specialized goods cross multiple borders while they are being produced. He argues that reductions in transportation costs and trade reforms more general than tariff liberalization also have a magnifying effect on trade. Ferrantino (2012) makes the link with trade facilitation explicit. He argues Ramos (2008) show that improvements in the Doing Business indicators 'Number of days' and 'Document required' to export/import have a relatively larger effect on technology-intensive goods and on differentiated products, as opposed to homogeneous ones. Marti et al. (2014) argue that improvements in the LPI have an effect which is larger for goods that are relatively more complex to transport. In a more direct test of Yi's hypothesis, Saslavsky and Shepherd (2012) show that trade in parts and components -which they assume takes place largely within production networks -is more sensitive to improvements in logistics performance than trade in final goods. These papers focus on the intensive margin of trade (bilateral trade value in a gravity framework). As discussed in Section 2, Persson (2013) As a first step, we estimate the ij regressions in two sub-samples: one in which the dependent variable is computed across the subset of intermediate products; one in which the dependent variable is computed across the subset of all other products. We are not able to find any significant difference between estimated coefficients across these specifications. To test this result further, in the ik sample we augment the regressions with an interaction term between a dummy equal to one if the product is intermediate and the Log(TFI) variable. We do not find the coefficient of this interaction term to be significant in most specifications.
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This leads us to conclude that the effect of trade facilitation on the extensive margin does not differ between intermediate and final products.
that NTMs and trade facilitation can be compared using a common metric. Efforts to reduce NTMs and efforts to increase trade facilitation should both have larger effects on trade in complex supply chains that on trade in simple supply chains. See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2014) and UNECA (2013) for less formal expositions, respectively by the business community and by an international organization, of the idea that trade facilitation should matter most for intermediate goods trade. 27 The results are available upon request.
Simulation results
In this section, we present the results of counterfactual analysis aimed at providing insights into the economic significance of our results. We estimate the percentage increase in the number of export destinations and in the number of exported products under two different scenarios. As shown in the 'sd' column of Table 2 , there is wide variation in TFI scores across countries belonging to the same geographical region. This suggests that a scenario involving convergence to the top regional performer would be very unrealistic. Such a scenario is, therefore, discarded a priori. Instead we consider two realistic scenarios. The first scenario is one in which each country with a TFI score below the median of the geographical region it belongs to increases its TFI to the regional median. The second scenario considers an increase to the global median.
It is important to note that results of counterfactual analysis have to be taken cautiously. First, because they are only as good as the underlying econometric model. Although we have taken care in addressing omitted variable and reverse causality biases, we cannot control for every possible country-specific variable correlated with trade facilitation and we cannot completely exclude the endogenous co-determination of trade outcomes and trade facilitation infrastructure. Second, the counter-factual analysis does not take into account that regional (global) median values would be affected by changes in trade facilitation occurring in all countries in the region (world).
With these caveats in mind, the baseline results, grouped by region, are presented in Table 10 for ij regressions and the results under the regional median scenario are averaged over the 8 bottom countries in terms of TFI, while the results under the global median scenario are averaged over all countries with the exclusion of the top regional performer. Tables 10 and 11 have two panels each. In the upper panel, we present results based on regressions using HS6 trade data. In the lower panel, we present results based on regressions using HS4 trade data. We use both the 'baseline' NB and the NB specifications with new products and new destinations. Since the estimates obtained in the latter specifications address the issue of reverse causality, we take them as our preferred results. We therefore discuss only the results of even-numbered columns.
< Tables 10 and 11 about here > As expected, the estimated gains in terms of number of products exported by destination (npd ij ) are quite similar in panels (a) and (b) of Table 10 (the correlation between npd ij computed from HS6 trade data and npd ij computed from HS4 trade data is 0.98), but also in panels (a) and (b) of In the case of the number of export destinations by product (ndp ik ), the estimated gains range from 7.2%
for South Asia (regional median scenario, HS4 regressions) to 27.9% for Sub-Saharan Africa (global median scenario, HS6 regressions). In this case, too, the gains are largest in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Conclusions
This is the first paper to focus exclusively on, and to provide detailed estimates of, the prospective effect of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on export diversification, as measured by the extensive margins of trade. We do so by using direct measures of trade facilitation that map into the obligations of the agreement, namely, the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators. We explore a variety of measures of the extensive margins of trade -the number of products a country exports to a given destination (npd ij ), the number of destinations to which a country exports a given product (ndp ik ), the Hummels-Klenow measure of the bilateral extensive margin (em ij ) and a similar measure of the country-product extensive margin (em ik ) that has not previously been explored in the literature.
The estimation results are convincing, with the coefficient on the trade facilitation variable being positive and statistically significant across almost all specifications. Using these estimates, we simulate the impact of implementing the agreement on developing countries' extensive margin of trade. Implementation of the agreement is measured using two alternative realistic scenarios -convergence to the regional median and convergence to the global median. Developing countries are likely to experience a substantial increase in the number of products exported and of destination markets. For Sub-Saharan African countries, our simulations suggest they could see an increase of up to 15.7% in the number of products exported by destination and an increase of up to 27.9% in the number of export destinations by product. For countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, our simulations suggest they could see an increase of up to 12.2% in the number of products exported by destination and an increase of up to 21.7% in the number of export destinations by product. For the reasons outlined in Section 6, these numbers have to be treated with caution. Nonetheless, they imply potentially sizeable impacts of the Trade Faciliation Agreement on extensive margins of export, and therefore on export diversification.
We see three potential avenues for further research. First, the analysis could be conducted at the level of specific TFI indicators. Such analysis would shed light on which provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation
Agreement have the most effect on the extensive margins of trade. Second, simulations could be based on actual implementation schedules which will have to be notified by WTO members. Third, research should focus on the effect of trade facilitation on trade margins computed from firm-level, as opposed to sector-level data.
Finally, we emphasize that we make no claim about the welfare effects of implementing the WTO Trade Descriptive statistics computed from the sample of column (6) of Table 5 Panel ( Descriptive statistics computed from the sample of column (7) of Table 6 Descriptive statistics computed from the sample of column (6) of Table 4 Descriptive statistics computed from the sample of column (6) of Table 4 -except for Log(remoteness) Descriptive statistics for Log(remoteness) computed from the sample of column (6) of (1)
Tables
Log ( Robust (clustered on partner j) standard errors in parentheses in columns (1)- (5) Bootstrap standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses in columns (6)- (7) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Partner j fixed effects, region dummies and MR controls always included
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